Understanding metaphors : the alethic theory by Snævarr, Stefán
 
Stefán Snævarr 
Understanding metaphors : the alethic theory 
Arbeidsnotat nr 125/2001 
 
Stefán Snævarr, første-amanunensis i filosofi. Doktorgraden i filosofi i 1998 fra 
Universitetet i Bergen på en avhandling med tittelen Minerva and the Muses. The 
Place of Reason in Aesthetic Judgements. Har publisert en hel rekke artikler om 
litteraturens filosofi, estetikk, etikk, narrativer  og metaforer.  
 
Stefán Snævarr, associate professor in philosophy. Ph.D. from the University of 
Bergen i 1998. The name of his dissertation was Minerva and the Muses. The Place 
of Reason in Aesthetic Judgement.  He has published a number of papers on the 
philosophy of literature, aesthetics, ethics,  metaphors and  narratives.  
 
Sammendrag: I denne artikkelen introduserer forfatteren sin teori om hvordan vi 
forstår metaforer. Han mener at det er metaforenes kognitive funksjon som gir oss en 
basis for å forstå dem. Vi forstår en metafor  M hvis og bare  hvis vi vet  under hvilke 
omstendingheter   M kan sies å være korrekt. Forfatteren sammenligner metaforer 
med karikaturer og hyperboler. Som ledd i begrunnelsen for denne teorien kritiserer 
forfatteren metaforteoriene til filosofene Max Black og Donald Davidson. 
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Abstract:  The author introduces his theory of the understanding of metaphors. He 
maintains that it is the cognitive function of metaphors which gives us a basis for 
understanding them. We understand a metaphor M if and only if we know what kind 
of conditions must obtain if M can be said to be correct. The author compares 
metaphors to hyperboles and caricatures. As means to justify his theory, he criticises 
the theories of Max Black and Donald Davidson.  
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Introduction 
 
Are metaphors anything but masques we put on sentences at the masquerade of 
language? What do we see when the masques fall off at midnight? The ugly reality of 
literal meaning?  
We will see in this paper that the masque theory of metaphors is not very 
convincing, a metaphor is more than just ornament, it also has cognitive functions. In 
order to show this, I will present my so-called ‘alethic theory’ of the understanding of 
metaphors. I maintain that the precondition for understanding metaphors (both 
linguistic and non-linguistic) is to understand the way they represent reality, a way of 
representation, which gives them their basic cognitive import.Notice that I am only 
talking about the understanding of metaphors, I will not try to answer the thorny 
question whether or not linguistic metaphors have a special meaning. Notice also that 
I am not talking about the psychological processes of understanding, I am talking 
about its logic. This means that I am trying to uncover the conditions that must obtain 
if person P can be said to have correctly understood metaphor M.  
I call my theory ‘alethic’ for two reasons. The first reason is that I think that the 
cognitive functions of metaphors bears some resemblance to Heidegger’s idea of 
‘aletheia’ or ‘disclosure’(Unverborgenheit). The German Meisterdenker seems to think 
that  propositional truth is depended upon some kind of absolute presuppositions 
which constitute conceptual schemes. These presuppositions have no truth values 
but constitute the truth values of propositions, just like the Ur-metre in Paris makes 
measurement in the metric system possible, but the question of measuring the Ur-
metre in terms of the metric system is meaningless. The presuppositions so to speak 
open up vistas of possible truth, discloses them. The question whether or not 
metaphors can be said to be absolute presuppositions (‘root metaphors’) is an 
interesting one but I will rather focus on their ability to disclose. We will return to these 
matters later and in the meantime take a look at my second reason:  I think that we 
understand metaphors by virtue of knowing their truth-like values, in a somewhat 
similar fashion as we understand certain linguistic strings by knowing the truth-
conditions of the propositions, expressed by the strings.As is well known, ‘aletheia’ in 
Greek means ‘truth’ and can also be translated as ‘that which is obvious’ or  ‘the real’. 
However, I use the word ‘alethic’ in a broad sense, I do not just connect it to truth. I 
use the concept of alethic values as ranging over both truth/falsity and truth-like 
values such as ‘the correctness of a map’, ‘the degree of a picture’s resemblance to 
its object’ etc.  Alethic values have in other words to do with the way meaningful 
entities (for instance pictures, models, maps, theories, propositions, sentences and 
last, but not least metaphors) referentially relate to segments of reality. The values in 
question are the yardsticks for our cognitive efforts.  
It has to be emphasised that this analysis neither commits me to any objectivistic 
nor subjectivistic conception of the relationship between meaningful entities and 
objects. The question whether or not these entities can mirror their objects in an 
objective fashion is irrelevant for my project.  
 
I. From Black to Davidson and back 
 
It does not seem plausible that non-lingual symbolic structures (N.L.S.S.), i.e. 
diagrams, maps, caricatures etc, can be adequately ‘translated’ into words (what 
would such a translation of a map of Tokyo look like?). This can be of importance for 
our understanding of metaphors, especially if Max Black is right about metaphors 
having less in common with descriptive statements than with maps, diagrams and 
suchlike. Metaphors, just like maps and diagrams, are not equivalent to a finite 
number of propositions, Black says. Further, metaphors are not elliptic similes, in 
some ways they create similarities rather than express them, as we indeed will see 
later. To be sure, metaphors have different similarity- and comparison-statements as 
implications, but as Black says: ‘Implication is not the same as covert identity: looking 
at a scene through blue spectacles is different from comparing that scene to 
something else.’ Therefore, metaphors cannot be paraphrased in literal language.   
Certainly, we can paraphrase parts of the relations between the two subjects of the 
metaphor (Man and wolf in ‘Man is a wolf’) literally but one should not expect too 
much of such a paraphrase. One reason among others is that a paraphrase would 
present the implications of the metaphor as being of equal importance while the 
metaphor itself gives the receiver (reader/hearer) the opportunity to weigh the 
importance in his/her own fashion. This is a strange argument because there is no 
reason why the receiver should not be able to judge the importance of the 
paraphrased implications. But if Black is right, then we are on the way to an 
understanding of why we should see A as being metaphorically B even if it is not 
literally B. Usually, conceptual boundaries are not rigid but elastic and permeable, 
Black says. He must mean that there can be cases where we can see A as B 
metaphorically, simply because there are no clear-cut boundaries between them. 
Black adds that the literal resources of our language are often insufficient to express 
our sense of the rich correspondence and analogies of domains conventionally 
separated. Black says that metaphors are cognitive devices without having truth-
conditions, just like maps, models and diagrams.  I think that this is quite correct and I 
will add that the similarities between metaphors and the N.L.S.S.’s is an indicator that 
metaphors have their own alethic values, different from the truth-values of 
propositions, theories etc. Black says that in some ways the metaphor transforms its 
object (Man ‘becomes’ wolf). To understand this he asks us to see what happens if 
we use the vocabulary of chess to describe a battle. This would lead to the 
highlighting of certain aspects of the battle while others are being downplayed or 
downright ignored. The vocabulary in question filters and transforms that which it 
describes and perhaps shows us aspects of the phenomenon (the battle) which would 
have been hidden without this particular vocabulary. It might for instance filter out the 
emotional aspect of the battle. Thus a metaphor like ‘a battle is a game of chess’ 
transforms the object but the transformation is no flight of fancy, it is constrained by 
facts about the battle. The metaphor creates objects but not ex nihilo; the chess 
metaphor forms the pre-existing battle into a chess-like phenomenon.  
I think it could be fruitful to liken this metaphorical ‘transfiguration of commonplaces 
(topoi)’ to the way in which mathematical models applied to non-mathematical 
physical reality transforms that reality into something mathematical and filters out 
those aspects of physical reality which escape mathematisation. Again we see a 
transformation which is not a creation ex nihilo, but the forming of pre-existing  
objects into a new mould, in our case a mathematical one, constrained by facts about 
these pre-existing objects. Needless to say, this alleged transformation has been 
extremely fruitful in the physical sciences, it has vastly increased our knowledge of 
the physical universe (that is, if we are not labouring under some gigantic illusions 
about it). If the analogy between mathematisation and the alleged cognitive role of 
metaphors is fitting then we have found an inning for the theory that metaphors can 
increase our knowledge.  
Black introduces his particular brand of the interaction theory of metaphoric 
meaning. According to this theory, two thoughts about two different objects are active 
together when we use a metaphor. These thoughts interact, as can be seen if we take 
a look at the metaphor ‘Man is a wolf’. When we use that metaphor two thoughts are 
active together. The metaphor organises our picture of man, stresses certain sides of 
humans, while downplaying others, cf. the chess-metaphor. The word ‘wolf’ acquires 
a new meaning, which is not quite its literal meaning and not quite the meaning of any 
of its synonyms. We not only see humans as somewhat wolfish, but wolves as 
somewhat human when we grasp the metaphor in question. Further, in order to 
understand this metaphor it does not suffice to know the usual dictionary meaning of 
the word, we must also know that which Black calls its ‘system of associated 
commonplaces’.   In our culture, we usually associate wolves with loneliness, cruelty 
etc.; these are parts of ‘the system of associated commonplaces’ of the word ‘wolf’.   
However, I do not find Black’s theory of interaction particularly convincing. In the 
first place, I think that his critics (Searle, Lakoff) are right about it being hard to see 
that we have to understand both the subject and the predicate of a simple metaphoric 
assertion in the light of each other, and hence differently from the standard use of 
these expressions. Do we really have to understand  ‘zero-sum game’ as somehow 
marriage-like in order to understand the metaphor ‘marriage is a zero-sum game’?  
Secondly, I wonder what criteria we have for anybody having really understood 
expressions, used in metaphors, in the light of each other. What do I know when I 
know that I and others have seen the wolf as somewhat human and that seeing the 
animal in this way is an integral part of understanding the metaphor ‘Man is a wolf’? 
What kind of criteria do I have for knowing that I or others possess this knowledge? I 
cannot for the life of me see what kind of criteria that would be. 
Donald Davidson is one of Black’s best-known critics. He maintains that metaphors 
do not express ideas or thoughts. Metaphors belong fairly and squarely to the 
pragmatics of language, Davidson says. He famously defends a truth conditional 
semantics; metaphors are more than often untrue and if they are elliptic similes then 
their meaning is simply literal and their truth trivial. The reason that their truth would 
be trivial is that everything can be said to be like something else in some respect. The 
words in a metaphoric utterance like ‘Man is a wolf’ mean exactly the same as they 
mean in literal contexts but they are used in a peculiar fashion. No one would say that 
we use words in a different sense when we lie, speak ironically or tell jokes, so why 
on earth should the use of words in metaphoric utterances give them a special 
sense? The fact that an utterance like ‘Man is a wolf’ can cause associations and 
reflections is a psychological, contingent fact and therefore without interest for the 
theory of meaning. The ‘systems of association’ of words like ‘wolf’ are contingent and 
thus, in contrast to what Black said, have no implication for the meaning of sentences. 
To be sure, a metaphor cannot be paraphrased but the reason is that there is nothing 
to paraphrase. An attempted ‘paraphrase’ is just an attempt to make a list of the 
thoughts and associations a metaphor can cause, and their number is in principle 
infinite. In actual fact, it is a misunderstanding to believe that the basic role of 
metaphors is to convey ideas, Davidson says. To be sure, a metaphor can make us 
discover facts, but not because it symbolises (represents) facts; in the same manner, 
jokes, lies or a good cup of coffee can inspire us to discover facts.  
However, in ordinary discourse we say ‘what is M a metaphor for?’, not ‘what is J a 
joke for’ or  ‘what is L a lie for?’. It is intuitively difficult to see how M can be a 
metaphor but for nothing in particular, which might be an indicator that metaphors 
somehow represent facts. Of course, our intuitions and habits of speech are not 
infallible; I certainly cannot refute Davidson’s analysis just by evoking intuitions and 
habits. But fortunately, there are some thinkers, including Frank B. Farrell and David 
Novitz, who have dealt Davidson’s arguments severe blows. Farrell is quite right 
when he points out that Davidson is inconsistent when he says on the one hand that 
sentences are the smallest meaningful entities of language, yet on the other hand, 
when discussing metaphors, talks solely about the meaning of words used in 
metaphors. Both Farrell and Novitz maintain that Davidson is on the wrong track 
when he says that metaphors only nudge us into noticing differences and similarities 
between phenomena. He does not understand that we can put forth statements with 
the aid of metaphors. Farrell and Novitz say that metaphoric utterances can have 
truth-conditions. Novitz uses as an example an utterance of Anthony in 
Shakespeare’s Julius Cesar ‘authority melts from me’. Given contextual evidence and 
a use of the principle of charity, we can construct the following T-sentence on the 
basis of Anthony’s metaphor:  
‘  ‘authority melts form me’ is true, when uttered by Anthony at time t if and only if 
Anthony was losing his power slowly but certainly on or about timet.’  The fact that 
such a T-sentence hardly has the liveliness and impact of the original metaphor does 
not matter since Davidson regards impact as belonging to the pragmatics of 
language. Novitz concludes by saying that if we know the truth-conditions in question 
we know the meaning of metaphors. So given truth-conditional semantics, metaphoric 
utterances can be meaningful in their own right. However, this analysis has its faults. 
It seems to suggest that we can paraphrase metaphors, but as we have already seen 
that is hardly possible. Further, the fact that there are pictorial metaphors creates 
problems for the contention that metaphors have truth-values. Pictures do not 
possess truth-values, and it would be strange if a pictorial metaphor of authority 
melting would not possess truth-values while its linguistic counterpart did. Since both 
are understood in a similar fashion it seems natural to look for a common factor which 
makes them understandable. That factor can hardly be truth-values, but it is fairly 
obvious that both kinds of metaphors can express (correct or incorrect) beliefs. 
Anthony can be said to express a belief with his linguistic metaphor and a pictorial 
cousin could do the same thing.  
Be that as it may, if the conception of Man as being wolfish is not an idea, then 
what is it? Typically, a metaphor involves thoughts (however weird); for instance ‘I 
wonder whether or not Man is a kind of a wolf’. Such thoughts can in many cases 
either square or not square with facts, in some cases facts of fictional worlds. So we 
are back where we started, with the idea of metaphors as being cognitive devices.  
 
II. Understanding caricatures, understanding metaphors.  
 
 I think it is obvious that such N.L.S.S.’s as maps, diagrams, visual signs and 
caricatures are meaningful but as we have seen they have no truth-values. So it is 
tempting to say that either we understand them by virtue of knowing the truth-values 
of certain sentences or by, say their (the N.L.S.S.’s) specific alethic values. As I said 
earlier, I think Black is quite correct about the N.L.S.S.’s not being entirely 
translatable into words. Nevertheless we understand them so we hardly grasp their 
meaning by virtue of knowing the truth-values of certain sentences. Therefore, the 
latter road seems worth travelling, the road of believing that the knowing of certain 
alethic values is the precondition for us understanding N.L.S.S.’s. I think that the 
following statement about the understanding of maps and other N.L.S.S.’s is true: We 
understand map M (diagram D etc) iff we know the conditions under which M (D etc) 
would be correct. 
Now, if Black is right about metaphors having a thing or two in common with maps, 
diagrams and pictures then we might be heading towards an interesting theory of 
metaphorical understanding. As I said earlier, I tend to believe that metaphors do not 
necessarily have to be linguistic, they can be pictorial or behavioural. George Lakoff 
and his associates quite correctly point out that both pictures and rituals can express 
metaphors. An example of a metaphorical ritual can be the custom of carrying a new-
born baby to the uppermost floor of a house and thus wishing the child a successful 
life (metaphorically: wishing that the child moves upwards). A caricature can show a 
person with a green face, a metaphor for an envious individual.  
If it makes sense to say that a caricature of a well-known politician looking like a 
peacock and a linguistic string such as ‘that politician is a peacock’ are two versions of 
the same metaphor (or two interrelated metaphors) then it is plausible to maintain that 
the conditions for their meaningfulness overlap. However, the meaning of a caricature is 
basically non-linguistic and as we shall see, linguistic metaphors can have cognitive 
import without having truth-conditions. The overlapping strengthens the idea of cognitive 
import, which is not a function of truth-values. At the same time we have seen in the first 
place that in order to understand N.L.S.S.’s we must know their alethic values; secondly 
we have discovered that metaphors have cognitive import. In light of this, it seems 
intuitively specious that the understanding of metaphors has something to do with 
knowing their cognitive powers and that the yardstick of these powers must be some 
kind of alethic value. At the same time, it does not seem likely that the alethic values in 
question are truth and falsity, both because linguistic metaphors are more often than not 
either false or trivially true, at least at first glance, and also because it seems plausible 
that linguistic metaphors share features with pictorial and behavioural metaphors.  I 
propose that we call the alethic value of metaphors (and their logical neighbours whom 
we will meet later) their  ‘m-correctness’. Being m-correct is also to be somehow fitting, 
adequate, right,  apt or even disclosing in some Heideggerian sense. But this does not 
tell us much about m-correctness so let us scrutinise it: A m-correct symbolic structure 
must have some kind of structural, though definitely not isomorphic, relation with the 
objects it represents, but the relation is more like the relation of caricatures to their 
objects than anything else. Actually, I think it is fairly obvious that even linguistic 
metaphors are like caricatures of their objects. Just like a caricature of de Gaulle makes 
his nose grotesquely big in order to highlight his megalomania, a linguistic metaphor like 
‘Man is a wolf’ makes a virtual caricature of Man in order to highlight some of his 
features (notice that in these cases, there are structural similarities between the 
symbolic structures and their objects, but certainly not isomorphic relations). Caricatures 
can be apt or correct, like many of the de Gaulle caricatures, which tell us more about 
the man than a host of literally true sentences, and something similar holds for 
metaphors. A metaphor like ‘France has become a widow’, uttered by Georges 
Pompidou after de Gaulle’s death tells us more about the political stature of de Gaulle 
than a literally true sentence like ‘de Gaulle was the president of France for eleven 
years.’(Pompidou’s linguistic metaphor can hardly be called ‘true’ since the utterance is 
strictly speaking false. Therefore its cognitive import (if any) must be connected to an 
alethic value, different from truth.)  Analogously, some of the great caricatures of de 
Gaulle are more informative of his personality and position than most photographs. 
Notice that metaphors tend to be like hyperboles, they exaggerate certain aspects of 
phenomena (the wolf-like features of man) and the same holds for caricatures, cf. the 
nose of the French president. This fact strengthens our contention that there is a 
structural similarity between metaphors and caricatures. I also think that my analysis 
makes it plausible to think that metaphors do not monopolise m-correctness, both 
caricatures and models (perhaps also similes) can possess this quality (these are 
among the aforementioned ‘logical neighbours’). They rather disclose than mirror reality, 
they show rather than tell and have thus an alethic function in a somewhat Heideggerian 
sense. Now, it is fairly obvious how caricatures or pictorial metaphors show rather than 
tell, but what about linguistic metaphors? I think we can get inspiration from the theories 
of Frank Palmer. He contrasts ‘showing’ with ‘telling’, the latter being a simple 
description of states of affairs like ‘I am not feeling very well, my wife has left me’. 
Poems, which  are worth their salt do not just contain the poet’s descriptions of his state 
of mind, but rather shows it with the aid of images,  metaphors, and such literary devices 
as rhythm. Palmer only discusses metaphors in passing, but it is fairly obvious that using 
a fresh linguistic metaphor is not just telling how things are but rather show them in a 
wide sense of the word.  The metaphor’s way of showing is probably a distant cousin of 
the Wittgensteinian sense of showing, which I actually think is related to Heidegger’s 
disclosure. According to Wittgenstein, pictures (in a wide sense of the word) cannot 
picture the logical form they share with what they are a picture of. Similarly, a tautology 
cannot say that it is a tautology, it can only show that is a tautology. Needless to say, the 
last  way of showing cannot be visual. My educated guess is that a linguistic metaphors 
can show things in this non-visual way, ‘Feyerabend is the Nietszche of the philosophy 
of science’ can show or disclose aspects of the relationship between the thoughts of 
these thinkers. However, visualising their thought is not an option. Further, fresh 
metaphors show in the sense of disclosing  phenomena in a new fashion. Both the  
fresh and the not so fresh metaphors  shows us one kind of a thing in terms of another, 
give us what Lakoff and his associates call an ‘indirect understanding’ of phenomena.  
Now, there are probably those who would object to my  analysis on the ground that 
caricatures and metaphors cannot possibly be said to be correct or incorrect because 
they transform reality, and cannot therefore represent it. But as we have seen, the 
mathematical models of natural scientists certainly transform their object, it does not 
seem likely that mathematical relations exist in nature. Mathematics and metaphors 
cause metamorphoses, but these metamorphoses can be cognitively productive.  
 Given our discussion I think it is fairly obvious that knowing the conditions of a 
metaphor’s m-correctness must be a necessary condition for the understanding of its 
meaning. This goes for both linguistic and other types of metaphors. So I think that the 
following is true: I understand metaphor Miff I know under which conditions M would be 
m-correct.  
Notice that this theory does not imply that metaphors can only be used for cognitive 
purposes. A metaphor can be used for various ends, including ornamental ones, there 
are cases where metaphors are masques. The point is that in order to understand a 
metaphor we must grasp its cognitive import.  
We have seen in this paper that Black was right about the cognitive import of metaphors 
but wrong about metaphoric meaning.  We have also discovered that Davidson’s 
analysis of metaphors does not seem very convincing. Further, it seems that metaphors 
share a host of features with caricatures and hyperboles, and that they disclose or show 
rather then tell. Most importantly, metaphors have certain conditions of correctness, the 
knowing of which enables us to understand them. 
A masque can be very seductive, and in the Italian film ‘Il Postino’ an old lady maintains 
that ‘metaphor’ must mean ‘seduction’. In a way, the old woman was right, we use 
metaphors as means to seduce reality, lure it to reveal its true nature.  
Metaphorics and erotics are one. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
